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On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed
into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), signaling the most comprehensive health
care reform since the Medicare program.I PPACA
addresses a range of access, quality, and cost issues
affecting health care providers, patients, and payers
alike. One of its major goals is to curb health care
provider fraud and abuse, which will ultimately help
conserve federal health care program funds to allow
for greater access to health care coverage.
The PPACA includes several provisions to meet
this end. These provisions initiate a shift towards
more proactive fraud deterrence through requiring
screening and enrollment procedures; incentivizing
compliance with enhanced enforcement mechanisms
and new civil monetary penalties; and clarifying legal
standards to establish False Claims Act and health care
fraud liability. Other provisions demand increased
disclosure, transparency and coordination in order to
achieve more effective health care fraud and abuse
prevention.
This article identifies and summarizes the PPACA
provisions modify ing health care fraud and
abuse regulations, enforcement, and compliance.
Additionally., the article analyzes precedent and prior
regulations supporting these changes, including:
explanations of modifications that affect False Claims
Act liability; regulation of physician referrals and
the new Physician Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol:
the provider screening and enrollment process;
transparency requirements; and other enforcement
mechanisms.
Finally, the article describes the
PPACA provisions related to forming accountable
care organizations (ACOs), particularly in light of the
Department of H ealth and luman Services (HHS)'

authority to waive certain fraud abuse laws in order to
establish compliant ACOs.

LFalse Cla"ims Ac t I'ability"11UnIId er -th11e

A. Anti-Kickback Law Violations Now Establish
False Claims Act Liability
The PPACA includes several provisions that make
substantial changes to deter health care fraud and
abuse. The PPACA clarifies and further defines several
standards applied to establish False Claims Act liability.
By amending the federal anti-kickback statute, the
PPACA clarifies that anti-kickback violations can
trigger False Claims Act liabilit. The modifications
to the anti-kickback statute state that "a claim that
includes items or services resulting from a violation
of this section constitutes a false or fraudulent claim,"
thereby falling within the ambit of the IFalse Claims
Act's proscriptions.
Under the anti-kickback statute, "it is a felony for a
person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit,
or receive...remuneration...in return for a referral or

to induce generation of business reimbursable under
a federal health care program." 'The
PPAC A clarifies
the criminal intent required to violate the statute 4 by
amending Section 1128B of the Social Security Act to
state that a defendant does not need specific intent to
violate the anti-kickback statute.' The new scienter
standard established by the PPACA prevents defendants
from escaping liability by arguing ignorance of the las.
While broadening the intent standard, this provision
does not remove the requirement that the government
prove the defendant "knosingly and willfully"
engaged in unlawful conduct.'
Prior to the passage of the PPACA, several courts
reached different conclusions on the evidentiary
standard implied by the federal anti-kickback statute's
reference to "knowingly and willfully" engaging in
conduct that violates the statute." Ihe knossing and
vsillful language swas added to the statute through
amendments in 1980. 1The legislatisve history suggests
that it wxas included to present imposing criminal
penalties in circrunstances wxhere the detendant's
v iolation of the statute ssas Inot deliberate.~

Through Section 6402(f) of the PPACA, Congress dednes the scienter
standard necessary to violate the anti-kickback statute. In so doing.,
it rejects certain constructions of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
"knowing and willful" in Jianlester Networkiv. Shalala."In Hanlester,the
Ninth Circuit "construeldi 'knowingly and willfully' in § 1128B(b)(2) of
the anti-kickback statute as requiring appellants to (1) know that §11 28B
prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals, and (2)
engage in prohibited conduct with the specide intent to disobey the law."'II
Hanlester can be read to require proof that the defendant had actual
knowledge of and specideally intended to violate the anti-kickback statute
in order to have the requisite intent to be subject to its penalties. Although
acknowledging this, several other courts declined to interpret the criminal
intent required by the anti-kickback statute so narrowly. For example,
in United States v. Aeufeld, the court posits that the requirement that the
defendant "knowingly and willfully" engaged in conduct that violates the
statute was not meant to "equate 'willfulness' with knowledge of illegality
[or] mandate the availability of a defense of ignorance of the law."12 Rather,
it was to prevent "prosecuting those acting inadvertently."i Instead of
adopting Hanlester's interpretation, Neufeld suggests "a formulation of
'willful' [that] takes into account the purpose to commit a wrongful act"
would serve better in achieving Congress' intent in incorporating this
language in the statute.14
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v Jain could also be
interpreted to establish that proof, of the defendant knowing his conduct
was wrongful," is sufdcient to satisfy the anti-kickback statute's "knowing
and willful" requirement.' Specideally, the Eighth Circuit refused to adopt
an interpretation of the anti-kickback statute that requires proving that the
defendant "violated a known legal duty," but still required the government
to meet a "heightened mens rea burden."' This standard required proof
that the delendant knew the conduct was unauthorized or wrongful.
In Med Dev. Network v. ProfI Respiratory Care/Home Vied. Equip Servs.
IcC., a Florida District Court refused to apply Hanlester x dednition of
"knowing and willful" as derived from the Supreme Court case Ratzlaf
v U.'nited States.
MVed. Dev. Network explains that the anti-kickback
statute can be "textually" distinguished from the banking statute at issue
in Ru/clef20 Unlike Ru/clef the anti-kickback statute does not have a
requirement that the "person must know that the statute prohibits the
conduct and intendis] to violate the law by engaging in such conduct."21

be aware of the specide law or rule that his conduct may be violating.
But he must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids.26
Applying this interpretation, Starks held that the government need only
prove the defendants knew that they "were breaking the laws-even if they
may not have knoxn that they were specideally violating the Anti-Kickback
statute." 27
In United States v Davis," the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the
Hanlester dednition of "knoxingly and willfully" requires the defendant
to know that the actions were unlawful and have a "specide intent to
disobey the laxw."29 Davis declined to construe the Hanlcester dednition
of "willfully" to require a shoxing of "knowledge of the particular law
allegedly violated.""o Therefore, the specide intent requirement that
Davis read into Hanlester is the specide intent to engage in an unlawxful
conduct irrespective of knowledge of the "particular statute" that would
be violated. TIhis interpretation allowed the Fifth Circuit to maintain the
dedtnition it applied in a prior case, Cnited St/a/es v. Garcia,"xwhichequated
"willfully" with "bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."
Even though this conflict between the circuits has existed for several years
with regard to interpreting the anti-kickback statute's scienter standard, 34
the PPACA did not make the sweeping changes some have suggested
are needed. Instead, it merely provides clarideation. By expanding the
evidentiary standard for proof of intent, the PPACA now makes it easier for
the government to prove scienter than under the Hanlester standard. Cases
decided since Jianlester demonstrate that the PPACA scienter standard
is not a signidcant deviation from precedent. Rather, it is aligned with
the legislative intent behind including the requirement that a defendant
"knowingly and willfully" violate the anti-kickback statute. In a separate,
but related issue, the PPACA "also provides that [p]ayments made by,
through, or in connection with [a] [Health Insurance] Exchange are subject
to the False Claims Act.. .if those payments include any Federal funds."35
B. Public Disclosure Bar Aiendments
Prior to the PPACA, the FCA's "original source" provision required that
a qui tam relaltor had to disclose his or her allegations to the government
before dling suit in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements on
public disclosures of the alleged fraud. The PPACA directly amends this
public disclosure bar 3 6 by amending Section 3730(e) of Title 31 of the US.
Code to include the following requirement: 37

Instead, it "provides for criminal penalties for whoever 'knowingly and

willfully' pays or receives remuneration for a referral."2 The Florida
District Court deelined to construe this to mean that a xviolation requires the
defendant to 'engage in the prohibited conduct xxith the speeide intent to
violate the statute.2

4(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section.
unless opposed by the Goxvemnment, it substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the aetion or claim wxerc
publicly disclosed-

Similarlx. United Staes v. S/arts does not folloxw the Ninth Cireuit in

(i) In a Fedleral criminal. cixil, or administrative hearing in xwhich the
Giovernnment or its agent is a partx,

rely ing on the Raizlaf dednition ot "knoxing and wxilltul."24 Instead, in
Starts, the Flexvendh Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in ryan v.
United Sitatesx to support its interpretation of aeting "wxillfully." In Bryan,
the Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction that stated:
A person acts xvillfully if he acts intentionally and purposelx and
with the intent to do something the laxv forbids, that is. with the bad
purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the person need not

(ii) In a congressional, CGovernment Accountability Ofdce. or other
Federal report, hearing, audit or investigation, or
(iii) From the news Iedia,
m
unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an orioinal
source of the information. 38

The PPACAs modifications limit the scope of the FCA's previous
public disclosure bar. First, dismissal is not required if opposed by the
government. 3 Proceedings such as state-level hearings or reports no longer
constitute public disclosures, since the amendment specifies that only a
"Federal ... hearing in which the government or its agent is a party' and
"congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report,
hearing, audit or investigation"
t iggeis the bar. 4 0 Thus, the
PPACA nullifies the issue of
wxhether a state report cn be
considered a public disclosure
While dhe PPACA\was being
debated, Graham County Soil &
Watner Conervation Dist v. C/
ev rel. l.son4 i
peing.

A

.important
...

For compliance purposes, it is
to be cognizant of the
Sevolution of the obligation related
to oxveipay meats to understand
the impact on potential rexerse
lalse claims liabilit.
The
PRACA is the first federal laxw to

repoiting and ireturninlg
oxverpay meats 60 day s after their
identitication.
Although this
obligation has been referenced
in prior proposed regulations
by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Serxvices (CMS),
it nexver becanme incorporated
into the final rules. CMS tried
sexveial times to pionmulgate iegulations requiring niandatory ieporting
ot overpaxments-the agency's xviexx of oxerpay meats and the need to
ieturn and ireport has long been apparent. The 2009 passage of the Fraud
Enaforcement and Recoxery Act (FER1A), Public Lass 111-21. which
amended the False Claims Act. made eoncealing and axoiding the obligation
irequiire

.S

before the Supreme Court. As
a result of this case claims must

franme ot the case. 42 Accordinig
to Graham (Count*, a non-tedeial
report can be considered a public disclosure but only it the case swas brought
before Maich 23, 2010, the date the PPACA xxas enacted.4 3 Notably this is
because the PPACA amendments are not retroactixve. 44
C. Chaniges to the Definition of an

for purposes of establishing FCA liability.49 Although overpayments could
have resulted in Medicare fraud and abuse liability in the past, there is no
specific, comprehensive Medicare repayment statute or regulation that
referred to the government's recovery rights." The PPA'CA elucidated the
meaning of "obligations" by explicitly defining the legal requirements for
overpayments.

"Original

Source"

Prior to the PPAC A, "[a] relator xxas defined as an original source if the
ielatoi had direct and independent knowsledge of the intormation on xxhich
the allegations ot the 1FCAY claim aie based and had svoluntarily proxided the
intormation to the gosvemnent before filing an action."4
In Section 1313, the PRACA4 amends Section 3730(e) of Title 31 of the U.S.
Code, changing the definition of original source to the folloxxing.
4(B) Foi purposes of this paragraph, "oiriginlal source" means
an individual wxho either (i) prior to a public disclosure under
subsection (e)(4)(a), has xvoluntarily disclosed to the goxvemnent the
information on wxhich allegations or transactions in a claim are based,
or (ii) wxho has knoxxledge that is independent ot and nmaterially adds
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and whlo has
voluntarily provided the information to the gosvemnent before filing
an action under diis section. 46
The PPACA extends xxho can be considered an "original source" to those
persons xxho haxe "kn~oxwledge that is independent of and imatei'ially add>"
to the information that wsas publicly disclosed (exen if the knoswledge xwas
not necessarily direct) amid xwho prosvides that imforniation to the government
betore filing an action. 47

Section 6402(a) of the PPACA requires the reporting and returning of
overpay ments either 60 day s after the identification of an overpay ment
or on the date any corresponding cost report is due.48 Importantly, the
PRACA clarifies that the return of such an overpayrment is an "obligation"

to pax an oxveirpay ment a basis for False Claims Yet liability.~
Nor wxas the PPACA the first attempt to impose a specific deadline toi the
reportiig aid ieturn of oxerpaymets. In a CMS proposed rule published
in the Federal Register, 67 Fed. Reg. 3662 (Jan. 25, 2002), the agency
referenced a duty to report and return oxverpaxyments deivxed fiorn Sections
1870, 1871. and 1102 of the Social Secuiity Yet.) The regulation deseiibes
the attempts that the ageney had prexviously made to impose a mandatory
reporting requirement. For instance, the June 26. 1998 Medicare ±
Choice Interim Final Regulations attempted to create an obligation for M
+C organizations to "self-identify" oxverpaymients. IThe final regulations
issued on June 29, 2000 eliminated this self-reporting requirement because
singling out M i C organizations wxas unfair.53 Despite the xwithdrawxal of
the requirement, CMiS stated that it intended to develop policies towsards
this end.>4 IThe discussion in die 2002 proposed regulation xxas an attempt
to tollows through with this goal. IThe rule the agency proposed explicitly
referenced a requirement to "report and return the oxverpaxyment, wxithin 60
daxys of identify ing the ov erpaxyment, to the aippropiate intermediary or
cariier at the correct addiess."
The proposed rule also stated that. pursuant to audiority deived tioni
Section 1128BJ(a)(3) of die Social Secuity Act, "failuie to notify [CMS]
of an oxverpay meat xwithin a reasonable period ot time sometimes may
establish criminal liability, and result in a referral to the IHHSI Office of
Inspector General." Thus, this irule serxves as a precursoi to more recent
legislation and regulations by specifying that failure to report overpayments
could result in criminal liability, and by imposing a sixty day timeframe
after identification durino which an overpayment must be reported."

I he regulation specifically provided that, upon
"identifying or learning" of an overpayment after
pay ment data has been certified or settled, a managed
care organization must notify CMS of the overpayment
within sixty days. Other entities were required to notify
CMS in writing of the overpayment within sixty days
of "identifying or learning" of it. Some attorneys have
suggested that Congress intended "identification" to
be based on a "substantial certainty of the scope and
existence" of the overpayment because the PPACA
language only refers to identifying the overpayment.
Quite plausibly, though, that additional language ("or
learning of it") used in the proposed regulation was
omitted simply because it was viewed to be redundant
or synony mous.
E. Modifications Related to Other Health Care
Fraud Offenses
The PPACA also changed the intent requirement
for proving health care fraud violations under 18
U.S.C.§ 1347-changes that are comparable to the
modifications to the anti-kickback statute's scienter
standard. The PPACA amends the intent requirement
in the health care fraud criminal provision to state that
'a person need not have actual knosswledge of [18 U.S.C.
§ 13471 or specific intent to commit a violation of 118
U.S.C.§1347].""
T hus, pursuant to the PPACA, federal health care
fraud offenses include not only anti-kickback statute
violations, but also offenses related to a 'health
care benefit program,' and violations of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and Section 501 of
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act
(ERISA).o"All health care fraud offenses will be
subject to increased penalties that will be developed
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission>. Additionally,
the PPACA calls for amendments to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to increase penalties related to
federal health care fraud convictions. 62
To comply with the PPACA's requirements on False
Claims Act liability, health care prosviders and their
counsel should understand that, as an enforcement
mechanism, the PPACA creates civil Inonetary penalties
for any kinoswiing failure to report overpayments.63IThe
increased requirements and penalties created by the
PPtACA thus demand prosvider svigi lance to accounting,
auditing, and detecting oxverpay ments. 64 Prosviders
swithout a comprehensisve conipliance plan f ocusing on
overpay ment identification need to adopt one.
A debate amongst members of the health lass bar
has emerged regarding
when an overpayment is
"identified" under this news provision. Even if there
are ambiguities within the current requirements, they

do not dictate different compliance practices: the
best practice is to return overpayments to the payer
(federal, state or private pay patient), regardless of
amount, upon identification. 61 In order to enforce
the new requirements related to overpayments, the
PPACA authorizes the imposition of civil monetary
penalties (CMPs) for knowingly failing to report an
overpayment. '6 Due to the changes in requirements and
newly established enforcement authority, updated and
comprehensive health care provider policies directed
tossward identifying any overpayments or other sources
of False Claims Act liability should be implemented. 6 7
Compliance Takeaways
* As an enforcement mechanism, "the [PPCA]
creates CMPs for any knossing failure to
report" overpayments.68
Additionally, a
provider can be excluded from Medicaid for
failure to refund overpayments.69
* Once providers of medical services are
excluded, not only are they prohibited from
billing directly for treatment of Medicare
and Medicaid patients, but they also may not
indirectly bill through their employer or group
practice. 0
* The increased requirements and penalties
created by the PPACA demand vigilance from
providers with respect to accounting, auditing,
and detecting overpayments. Providers who
do not have a comprehensive compliance plan
that focuses on overpayment identification
need to adopt one. Any documentation
pertaining to Stark exceptions must be
signed and all physician arrangements must
be negotiated at fair market value (FMV).72
Additionally, physicians should be careful
not to bill patients to make double payments
for services already paid for by Medicare by
charging an access fee for services that are
already covered by Medicare.
* It is important for pirovideirs to understand that
each time a claim tor seisvices is submitted
for a Medicaie or Medicaid beneficiary,
the provider is certifying compliance swith
statutory billing irequiirements and attestinlg
that the pay ment w5as, in fact, earned.
Therefore, any improper billing or coding
includino billing for loss quality or '"virtually
sworthless" sersvices could serse as a basis
for False Claimis Act liability.7 TIhere has
been some discussion surrounding when an
oserpayment is "identified" under this new
provision.

Iven if there is ambiguity in the

current requirements, such ambiguities do
not dictate different compliance practices:
"the best practice is to return overpayments to
the payor (Federal, State, or private patient),
regardless of amount, upon identiAcation."
In order to enlorce the new requirements
related to overpayments, the PPACA
authorizes the imposition of CMPs for
knowingly failing to report an overpayment.
Due to the changes in requirements and
newly established enforcement authority,
updated and comprehensive policies directed
toward identifying any overpayments or
other sources of False Claims Act liability
should be implemented. If an oxverpayment
is identiAed or suspected, a provider should
take the following steps: stop Aling bills
that may lead to further overpayments, seek
out legal counsel, calculate the amount that
was incorrectly collected from patients or
federal health care programs, report and
return overpayments, unwind or remove
oneself from problematic investments or
relationships, and consider using OIG's or
CMS's self disclosure protocols depending
on whether the Anti-kickback statute or Stark
law was implicated.
HHS OfAce of Inspector General (GIG)
has suggested the following compliance
measures to avoid fraudulent activities. These
include: conducting internal monitoring
and auditing, implementing compliance and
practice standards, designating a compliance
ofAcer., conducting appropriate training,
developing corrective action plans to respond
appropriately to detected offenses, opening
the lines of communication with employees,
and enforcing disciplinary standards through
well-publicized guidelines.
If a potential problem is identiAed or
suspected theie are a fewx axvenues that
piovideis can pursue to obtain adxvice and
assistance.
Professionals to contact and
references to rev iexw include: experienced
health eaire laxwyxers, state or local medical
societies, specialty societies for the particular
ty pe of practice, CMS local contractor
medical directors, and the CMS and GIG
xwebsites, guidances, and adxvisory opinions.7

A. Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol
IThe Stark law and regulations prohibit a physician
or immediate family member who has a Anancial
relationship with an entity from referring a patient
to that entity tor designated health services payable
through Medicare or Medicaid unless an exception
applies."
Section 6409 of PPACA established a
physician Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP)
as a process by which disclosing parties can resolve
and determine the extent of liability for identiAed Stark
lax violations.
In March 2009, OIG announced
that Stark laxx self-disclosures would not be accepted
unless "a colorable [anti-kickback statute] violation"
was also involved.
T'
Iherefore, the Self-Referral
Disclosure Protocol was necessary as a means to report
and resolve liability for Stark-only violations. CMS
published the Self-Relerral Disclosure Protocol on its
website on September 23, 201013 it should be used to
disclose any reportable events related to Stark issues
from that date forward.84
Although the SRDP gives the Secretary of IHIS
authority to make reductions in the amount due for
violations," it does not obligate the Secretary to do so
or to resolve a disclosed matter in any particular way. 8
In order to determine whether to grant a reduction, the
Secretary is authorized to take into account: "(1) the
nature and extent of the improper or illegal practice:
(2) the timeliness of the self-disclosure; (3) the
cooperation in providing additional information related
to the disclosure, (4) the litigation risk associated with
the matter disclosed; and (5) the Anancial position of
the disclosing party."
The protocol published by CMS explicitly states
that the SRDP should not be used to determine if a
violation occurred but, rather, is a means to "resolving
its overpayment liability exposure."" SRDP is distinct
from the Stark advisory opinion process CMS oversees
and. even if conduct could conceivably fall under
both SRDP and the OIG's self-disclosure protocol,
disclosures should not be made under both protocols."
After a disclosure submnission is made and rev iexwed,
CMS may coordinate xwith the GIG and the Department
of Justice (DGJ), and refer any matter to laxx
eatforceinent for consideration under cixvil and criminal
authorities.90 A disclosing party's submission can also
potentially be a basis for FC A or CMP liability upon a
determination bx CMS that it should be referied to OG
oi DGJ loi resolution>.\ dditionally, disclosure does
not reliexe parties from the responsibilitx to refund any
amounts collected from indiv iduals billed in xviolation

of physician self-referral.9 Parties must make timely disclosures pursuant
to the requirements of the Section 6402 of the PPACA related to reporting
and returning overpayments within sixty days of identification.
SRDP disclosure is also conditioned on giving up appeal rights.4 If a party
withdraxws or is removed from a protocol, existing appeal rights apply to
any overpayment demand letter." In these situations or if a party is denied
acceptance into SRDh reopening rules at 42 CFR§ 405.980-405.986 apply
from the date of the original disclosure.Q96 CMS can also refer any failure to
cooperate, false or untruthful information that was submitted, or omissions
of relevant information, to DOJ or other federal agencies; this could result
in criminal civil sanctions or exclusion." Further, an SRDP disclosure is
not a substitute for compliance or "reportable event requirements" under
HHS and DOJ corporate integrity agreements (CIAs) or certification of
compliance agreements (CCAs).9
CMS verification will take into account the "quality and thoroughness"
of submissions received.99 Matters revealed during veritications that are
outside the scope of the matter disclosed to CMS may be treated as new
matters outside SRDP'oo A disclosing party will also have to provide
access to relevant financial and other supporting documents without regard
to privilege (except for the attorney client privilege)."
Upon request for
additional documents, a party has thirty days to produce the information
to CMS. 102
Disclosures under the protocol must be submitted electronicallx to
1877SRDPacms.hhs.gov in the form of an original and one copy mailed
to the CMS Division of Payment Policy.") The disclosures should include
a description of the actual or potential violation including identifying
information about the disclosed matter. 104 They also should include
information regarding similar prior conduct and enforcement actions,
notices to other government agencies, and any knowledge of the matter or a
10
related matter being under inquiry by a government agency or contractor
Additionally, a signed certitication attesting to its truthfulness and that it is
a good faith effort to resolve liabilities by bringing them to CMS attention
should be included.1 0
The disclosing party must also conduct a financial analysis and submit this
financial analysis and report findings to CMS.10 The "look back" period
for the amount "due and owing" for purposes of this financial analysis
should be the time during which the disclosing party may not hasve been
in compliance with the Stark las.10s CMS will not accept payments of
possible overpayments until the inquiry is finished. While the inquiry
is in process, the disclosing party should not niake payments ielated to
disclosed matteis to federal health programs oi contractois xxithout CMS'
prior consent.109 Additionallx, if CMS does consent. the paity must proxvide
wxritten acknowsledlgemnent that it is not reliesved from any li'ihilitv melated to
the disclosed matter 110
From a conmpliance standpoint, phy sicians and their counsel should
undeistand that. effectisve September 23. 2010, the Self-Ref erral Disclosure
Protocol proxides a nieans to iesolxe oxerpaynient liability exposure
ielated to self-reteiral matters that are not connected to an anti-kickback
statute violation. Disclosure through the SRDP does not foreelose referral
of the matter (or related matters) to OIG, DO, or lasw enforcement' nor
does it immunize parties from FCA, civil or other criminal liability. 11'
Additionally, it does not guarantee any particular resolution, even though

the IHHI
IS Secretary is authorized to decrease the amount due for disclosed
violations.I"2
Compliance Take-Aiways
Effective September 23, 2010, the Self-Referral Disclosure
Protocol provides a means to resolve overpayment liability
exposure related to self-referral matters that are not connected
to an anti-kickback violation. Disclosure through the protocol
does not foreclose referral of the matter (or related matters) to
OIG, DOJ, or law enforcement; nor does it immunize parties from
FCA. civil or other criminal liability. " Additionally, it does not
guarantee any particular resolution, even though the Secretary is
authorized to decrease the amount due for disclosed violations. 1 14
Parties can reduce the risk of future liability and achieve finality
through the Protocol. In order to increase the prospects of a
favorable resolution, disclosing parties should keep in mind the
strong emphasis CMS seems to be placing on making a good faith
and thorough disclosure pursuant to the process laid out by the
Protocol."11

B. Disclosure Requirements for the In-Office Ancillary Services
Exception Un d er Stark
Section 6003 of the PPACA imposes new requirements on the in-office
ancillary services (IOAS) exception 116 to the Stark law. This exception to
the rules against physician self-referral allosss physicians to order or provide
designated health services (DHS) in their offices if certain requirements are

met." Ihe PPACA changes impose additional obligations on physicians
in order for them to fall within the IOAS exception.
TIhe changes require
that, at the time of referral, a physician must provide written notice to the
patient that indicates he or she may obtain services from someone other
than the referring physician or someone in his or her group practice.119
Additionally., the notice must provide a list of other suppliers who provide
the same service in the area.>o
On July 13, 2010, CMS published in the Federal Register a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NP\RM) implementing these PPACA changes.
CMS finalized the rule on November 29, 2010." The NPRM provides
fiurther details regarding specific information and related documentation
to be included in the disclosure, and a proposed date upon which the
requirements go into effect.' The disclosure requirement applies to MRI,
CT and PET radiology services.123
The disclosure should be in the forni of a wxritten iiotice that incltides the
names otfat least fixe other suppliers wxithin a 25 niile radius otfthe phxysician's
office (unless there aie Iexxer than ten in a 25 mile radius, in xwhich case die
names of all suppliers xxidiin the radius must be provided).124IThe list must
also include the name, address, phone number of eaeh of the suppliers on
the list.1 The list may also include proxvideis such as hospitals as long as
fixe suppliers are listed, beeause hospitals do not qualify as suppliers. 26
Although the PPACA prosvision ealls for "as written list of suppliers . . . wxho
furnish sueh sersvices in the area in wxhieh such indisvidual resides)"12 The
suppliers to be listed should instead be drawvn from the twventy-fisve mile
radius surrounding the physician's office.' The reasoning xwas that, if the
patient found it convenient enough to come to the doctor, going to another
supplier for services within twenty-five miles of the physician's office

would also be sufficiently convenient. T'he list must be updated annually
for accuracy.129
Disclosure must be provided to the patient at the time of referral. This
means the list must be provided to a patient "each tine one of the listed
advanced imaging services is referred," and this includes phone referrals. 130
Documentation must be kept by the physician's office to demonstrate
compliance with this requirement. Li The effective date for the final
regulation is January 1, 2011.132
Compliance Take-A\ways
The PPACA's changes to the in-office ancillary services exception
to the Stark law impose additional requirements on physicians.
As a result, physicians must be cognizant of the new obligation
to provide written notice at the time of referral of other suppliers
providing the same services in the area.
C. Restrictions on Physician-Owned Hospitals
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The PPACA significantly changes existing regulations and exceptions
pertaining to physician-owned hospitals. A "physician-ow ned hospital" is
defined in the Stark law and regulations as a "hospital (including a [Critical
Access lospital]) in which a physician or immediate family member of a
physician has an ownership or investment interest," unless the ownership
or investment interest satisfies certain exceptions or is related to publicly
traded securities and mutual funds.134
As a result of the PPACA changes, the "whole
hospital exception" to the Stark law has been
substantially narrowed, and will essentially
only apply to pre-existing physician-owned
hospitals that meet certain requirements..
On August 3, 2010, CMS published in
the lederal Register proposed regulations
implenmening the piosisions of the PPA
that imposed restrictions on the VShole4
hospital and rural prosvider exceptions."
These pioposals were entitled "Proposed
Chanoes to Whole Hospital and Rural
Prosvider Exeeptions to the Phy sieian SelfReferral Prohibition and Related Changes
to Prosvider Agreement Regulations.13
On Nosenmber 2, 2010. CMS released the
Hospital Outpatient Prospectise Pay ment
and FY 2011 Payment Rates F inal Rule,"3
wshich ssas published in the Federal Registe
on Nosembei 24, 2010.i
Prior to the 1PACA modification and the

Notably, the P1ACA changes only allow this whole hospital exception to
apply to existing and prospective hospitals that already have established
physician ownership or investment relationships on March 23, 2010 and
a Medicare provider agreement in efdfect by December 31, 2010.14' These
restrictions also apply to arrangements that would fall under the "rural
provider" exception.143
expansion of physician-owned hospitals is generally prohibited as of
the date the IPACA was enacted (March 23, 2010).144 'This means the
percentage of the total value of ow nership and investment interests held by
physician owners and investors in the aggregate cannot be greater than what
it was as of that date.145 The PACA and the implementing regulations
limit hospitals that fall under the exceptions to "the number of operating
rooms, procedure rooms, and beds for which the hospital was licensed as
of March 23, 2010."i46 Additionally, after this date. ambulatory surgical
centers will no longer be able to convert to hospitals.147
'The

T-he proposed regulation explains that phy sician owned hospitals must
comply vwith the Section 6001(a)(3) requirements, found in new Section
1877(i)(1) of the Social Security Act, by September 23, 2011.148 The
baseline number of beds, procedure rooms, and operating rooms should
be established by the March 23, 2011 deadline. If the hospital does not
have a provider agreement by then (but has one by the December 31., 2010
deadline), the baseline number provided as of enactment of the agreement
applies.149
Rural provider hospitals also have until
September 23, 2011 to meet the new
requirements. PPACA requires that HHS
"establish policies and procedures to
ensure compliance," which may "include
unannounced site reviews of hospitals."iSO
Beginning no later than May 1, 2012, the
Secretary must conduct audits to determine

if hospitals are in compliance with new
Sectioii 1877(i)(1).I he 1HS Secretary is
also recpuired to 'collect, publish, and update
on an annual basis on the CMS Web site"
phy sician ossnership intormation pursuant to
this rule.""
The final rule also clarifies that, despite
the reference made to licensed roonis, die
restimction on expansion applies to opemating
rooms and procedure rooms esven it a state
does not specifically license them." The final
rule exlplains tbhat procediure rnoms aire rooms
in svhich catheterizations. angiographies,

proposed implementing regulations, time
exception to the Stark law prosvided that a
"meterring physician is authoizied to perfornm
seisvices at the hospital" it the phy sician's "ossnership or investment intemest
is in die hospital itselt (and not merely in a subdisision of die hospital)."'140

angiogranis, and endoscopies are performed,
but does not inelude emergency roonis or
departnimnts unless omie of the aforementioned
procedures is performed therc.i 4 Further, as lono as the baseline nunibcr
of beds or procedure roonis does not change, a bed or procedure room niay
be retired amid replaced w\ith a ness oneiss

A referring physician and a hospital with a financial relationship falling
under this exception thus could still present claims for DHS to federal
health programs without violating the Stark law.141

With regard to new Section 1877(i)(1)(C)(i) on preventing conflicts of
interest, the regulations specify that hospitalswith physician ownership

must create an annual report identifying each physician owner and investor,
along with other ovners and investors. IThis report shall include the nature
and extent of the physicians' ownership interests. The hospitals must
submit this annual report to the 1H11S Secretary. Procedures for this annual
reporting requirement haxve not been finalized at this point"' Additionally,
required disclosures related to physician ovnership need to be made to the
patient in time to permit a meaningful decision. 1

* These hospitals are also subject to increased disclosure obligations
including annually reporting physician ovswner and other investor
interests, which will be subject to conflicts checks. Disclosures to
patients and on advertising are required.

A. Screening Levels
Furthermore, physician owners cannot be offered more favorable terms
than non-physician owsners with respect to ownership or investment
interests.
lospital ovners cannot provide loans to finance physician
owner investments or guarantee or subsidize loans related to securing a
hospital ownership interest. Distributions to physician owxners related to
insvestment returns must be directly proportional to the ownership interest.
The regulations also restrict the rights of physician owners with respect to
purchasing and leasing property affiliated with, near, or in the control of
the hospital. Specifically, physician owners cannot be guaranteed a right
to purchase or be offered more favorable teras than non-physician oxxners
and imvestors.
The PPACA provisions also include a "Patient Safety"
section that is referenced in the proposed regulation. The
NPRI obligates physician-ovned hospitals to make a
disclosure to the patient prior to admission if the hospital
does not have a physician on site, every hour of the day that
is providing services to such patient." The patient must sign
an acknowledgment and send it to the hospital to document
the disclosure. Physician-owned hospitals must be capable
of providing initial treatment and assessment of patients, as
well as referrals and transfers, if necessary. The proposed
regulation sets September 23, 2011 as the deadline for

T he PACA has imposed several new requirements on providers and
suppliers as part of an eftort to initiate a shift toward fraud prevention rather
than mitigation and enforcement after the fact. T'his is in-keeping with a
larger effort by CMS, which includes adopting new measures, technologies,
and techniques of preventing fraud. Ior instance, federal investigators
will begin using a new tool called "predictive modeling" that will allow
Medicare officials to detect fraud prior to payment by using sophisticated
computerized analysis."'i This will allow investigators to identifb fraud
practically as it is being committed (or in "real time").162
Section 6401 of the PPACA requires the IIS Secretary to create
procedures Ior provider and supplier screening. This section
also directs the Secretary to implement a system of risk
level categorization of federal health program provider and
supplier participants.

I

compliance with these requirements.15

From a compliance standpoint, the PiAC A essentially eliminates the
"whole hospital" exception of the Stark las, except as applied to preexisting physician owned hospitals. To fall under the modified exception,
hospitals must have established physician ownership or investment and
a provider agreement in effect by Decenber 31, 2010. The PPACA also
prohibits expansion of existing physician-owned hospitals beginning
March 23, 2010. These hospitals are also subject to increased disclosure
obligations including annually reporting physician oxner and other
investor interestsl.
which will be subject to conflict of interest verification.

Additional disclosures to patients and on advertising are also required.
Any documentation pertaining to Stark exceptions must be signed and all
physician arrangements must be negotiated at fair market value (FMV).So
Compliance Take-Aways
* The PPAC'A essentially eliminates the "whole hospital" exception
of the Stark lass except as applied to pre-existing physician
oxned hospitals. To fall under the modified exception, hospitals
must have established physician owsnership or investment and a
provider agreement in effect by December 31, 2010.
* The PPACA also prohibits expansion of these existing physician
owned hospitals beginning March 23. 2010.

Ihe PiACA provision allows for several different screening
\Imechanisms including, but not limited to: "licensure

.1

-dL

Ak,

checks . . criminal background checks, fingerprinting.,
unscheduled and unannounced site visits, [and] database
checks."64 These requirements will not be imposed on
new providers until March 2011, and current providers

have until March 2012 for the requirements to set in. i65 The
provision also requires disclosure information from providers and suppliers
indicative of prior fraudulent activity and affiliations. These include
obligations to disclose uncollected debt, incidents in which payments were
suspended, and any prior exclusion or revocation of billing privileges from
a federal health care program. This information could serve as a basis for
the Secretary to deny enrollment based on an assessnent of related risk.166
The provider screening requirements in Section 6401 were addressed
and expanded upon in a proposed rule published by CMS in the Federal
Register on September 23, 2010: Medicare, Medicaid, and Children's
lealth Insurance Prograns; Additional Screening Requirements,
Application Fees, einporary Enrollment Moratoria, Paynent Suspensions
and Compliance Plans for Providers and Suppliers. 67 Ihe final rule was
published on February 2. 2011.161
The new screening procedures implemented pursuant to Section 1866(j)
(2) of the Act are applicable to newly enrolling providers and suppliers
beginning on March 25, 2011.169 On March 25. 2011. they are applicable
to providers and suppliers currently enrolled in the Medicare, Medicaid
aiid CHIIP programs that rexvalidate enrollnmeiit.iv
In implementino the PPXCA proxision, CMS adhered to the framewxork
of designating three lexvels of risk: limited moderate, and high." The
limited risk category includes: "phy sician or non-phy sician practitioners
[except for phy sical therapists and phy sical therapist groupsj and nmedical
groups or clinics. proxviders or suppliers that are publicly traded on the

NYSE or NASDAQ; ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs); end-stage renal
disease (ERSD) facilities; Federally qualified health centers (FQIICs).
histocompatibility laboratories; hospitals, including critical access hospitals
(CA-Is); [health programs operated by an Indian Health Program];1
mammography screening centers; organ procurement organizations
(OPs); mass immunization roster billers; . . . religious nonmedical health
care institutions (RNHCIs); rural health clinics (RHCs); radiation therapy
centers; skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)," occupational therapy and speech
pathology providers; Competitive Acquisition Program/ Part B Vendors; and
pharmacies that are newly enrolling or revalidating via the CMS-855B.I72
Providers and suppliers in the limited risk category would be subject
to the following screening methods: (1) verification of any provider/
supplier specific requirements established by Medicare; (2) verification
of compliance with relevant licensure requirements, including licensure
across state lines; and (3) ongoing (pre- and post-enrollment) database
checks to ensure continued adherence to enrollment criteria. These
include verification of social security number (SSN), National Provider
Identifier (NPI), the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), licensure
on OIG exclusion, tax delinquency, death of individual practitioner, owner,
authorized official, delegated official, or supervising physician.173
The regulation deems the following providers and suppliers to be
"moderate risk" for screening purposes: "ambulance suppliers, community
mental health centers (CMHCs), comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation
facilities (CORFs), hospice organizations, IDTFs, independent clinical
laboratories, portable x-ray suppliers, physical therapists and physical
therapist groups."' 4 Additionally- revalidating DMEPOS and home health
agencies are categorized as moderate risk.
In addition to the pre-existing
screening methods, "moderate" risk entities can also be screened through
pre-enrollment unannounced and unscheduled site visits at any time.i,6
IThe Medicare contractors conducting these unscheduled visits may
verify "established supplier standards or performance standards" besides
conditions of participation in order to confirm compliance with program
requirements.177
lome health agencies (1H111As) and suppliers of durable medical equipment,
prosthetics, orthotics and supplies (DMEPOS) are assigned to the high
risk category, due to their particular established susceptibility to fraud.
"Owners, authorized or delegated officials, or managing employees" of
high risk providers can be subject to additional screening mechanisms..
Specifically, the final rule requires fingerprints to be collected from all

individuals with "5 percent or greater direct or indirect owxnership interest in
the provider or supplier."i" 9 These individuals wsill be subject to fingcr-print
based criminal history rcport checks of the Fedcral Bureau of Insvestigations
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification Sy stem.Iso
A prosvider or supplier's category may be adjusted from "limited" to
"moderate" screcaing to "high" screening wvhen: "The prosvider or supplier
has been placed on a presvions pay ment suspension wxithin thc presvious tcn
y ears; or the prosvider or supplier has beca excluded by thc HHS GIG and
is attempting to establish additional \Icdicarc billing prisvilcges for a news
practice location or by enrolling as a nexs prosvider or supplier", the provider
has been terminated or "otherwsise precluded from billing Medicaid" or in
a six month period after a temporary moratorium is lifted (including if a
provider or supplier is revalidating their enrollment if the moratorium is

applicable to them); or the provider or supplier has been subjected to a
"final adverse action".'
No provider or supplier will be allowed to enroll in Medicare after March 23,
2013 without being screened under the requirements of this regulation.182
To meet this effective date, CMS is permitted to require a provider or
supplier to revalidate enrollment at any time and then the current cycle
(three years for DVMEPIOS and five years for other providers applies.183
Due to the prevalence of fraud and abuse violations attributed to DME and
home health services, the PPYCA imposes several additional requirements
on providers of these services and equipment. Such protections include
requiring face-to-face encounters between physicians and providers at
most six months prior to requests for DMEPOS or home health services.i14
Pursuant to the ITACA, Medicare enrollment is required for all physicians
ordering DMEPOS and home health services.
Additional restrictions on reimbursement apply to areas identified as
particularly high risk due to recent identified fraudulent activity and
enforcement. 11 In these high risk areas, the HHS Secretary is also authorized
to withhold payment for 90 days after a new DMEPOS supplier enrolls and
submits its first claim for payment.186 The enrollment process is used by the
PPt-ACA as another mechanism for identification and enforcement against
fraudulent DMEPOS suppliers..
Physicians or suppliers that do not
maintain and provide information and documentation regarding requests or
referrals related to payment ot DM1EPOS or certifications for home health
services when requested by the Secretary, can be disenrolled.ii
B. Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
Enrollment
IThe requirements pertaining to Medicaid and CHIP enrollment are included
in the Medicare, Medicaid, and Children's IHIealth Insurance Programs;
Additional Screening Requirements, Application Fees, Temporary
Inrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions and Compliance Plans for
Providers and Suppliers regulations. Section 6501, which requires that
states terminate providers from their Medicaid programs due to exclusion
from Medicare or any other state's Medicaid program, is implemented
through these regulations.
To ensure compliance, the PPACA suggests applying the same screening,
application, and moratorium requirements that will be used or the
Medicare program to Medicaid and CIl'91 Under the PPACA, the HHS
Secretary is authorized to make unscheduled unannounced site visits
including pre-enrollment svisits for prospectisve and enrolled M edicaid and
CHIP prosvidcrs.i 9 0
Additionally the PP\C A increases the disc losuie and shaiing of exclusion.
suspension and teimination intormation betwseen federal health care
programs, and iequires Medicaid exclusion based on other progiam
cxclusions.'
Importantly the PPAC A authorizes denial of enrollment for
failing to piov idc information of a prosvider/owsner's consviction of a criminal
offense relatcd to federal health care program insvolv ement.192 Additionally
all institutional prosvidcrs xwill be charged an application fee and wxill hasve to
3
prosvide a National Prosvidcr Identifier on their applications.19 Physicians
ordering or referring services must enroll in the Medicaid progran as
participating prosviders with National Prosvider Identifiers, but they will not
be assessed an application fee.194

States may rely on the results of screening conducted
by a Medicare contractor to meet requirements under
Medicaid and CHlIP for dually enrolled providers.'19
Generally, the same provider screening regulations
apply to Medicaid and CHIP and states should use
the same risk level assigned to a category of providers
by Medicare.196 With regard to Medicaid and CHIP
providers not recognized by Medicare, the regulation
provides that states should assess the risk posed by a
particular provider type, but when possible, this should
be undertaken using similar criteria used in assessing
risk to create the Medicare risk categories. il All
providers participating in CH1IP are subjected to the
same provider screening requirements that apply to
Medicaid providers.9
Prerequisites to Enrollment
The final rule makes the assignment of a Medicaid
Provider Identification number contingent on holding
a valid professional license.199 Additionally, states are
required to collect Social Security Numbers and DOBs
for everyone with ownership or control interests in a
provider.00 If a provider is categorized within the high
level of screening, those with five or percent or more
direct or indirect ownership interest in the provider
are subject to fingerprinting and criminal background

date the new screening measures take effect for
each provider group: March 23, 2012 for providers,
suppliers, and eligible professionals currently enrolled
in Medicare., Medicaid and CHlIP; and March 25, 2011
for all revalidated entities.209 Ihe 2010 application fee
of $500 for providers and suppliers will be increased
by an amount reflective ofthe percentage change in the
consumer price index each subsequent year.210
Providers can be exempt from the application fee by
the Secretary; the fee can also be waived on a case-bycase basis if it is found that it would cause economic
hardship.'II
If a provider submits an exception
request, but it is denied, the provider will have thirty
days to submit the application fee.21 An institutional
provider may appeal the denial of a hardship exception
through a provider appeals process.21 For Medicaid
and CHIP, a range of providers are listed, but the
rule authorizes states to impose an application fee on
"any institutional entity that bills the State Medicaid
program or CIP on a fee-for-service basis."4 States
are authorized to collect provider screening fees for
providers that do not participate in Medicare.
A
Medicare contractor is authorized to rescind Medicare
billing privileges if an institutional provider fails to
submit an application fee or hardship exception request
with a Medicare revalidation application.216

checks.201

Termination and Denial of Enrollment

The IIS Secretary may make unscheduled
unannounced site visits, which can include preenrollment visits for prospective and enrolled providers
in the Medicaid and CHIP programs.20 States must
conduct pre- and post- enrollment site visits for
providers in "high" and "moderate" categories.203

The final rule also provides further guidance on a
range of circumstances that could lead to refusal or
termination of enrollment. States are required to deny
or terminate the enrollment of providers:

National Provider Identifiers have previously been
required on all enrollment applications pursuant to
section 6402(a) of the PPACA, as amended by the May
04
5, 2010 interim final rule with comment period.2
All "physician[s] or other professional[s] ordering or
referring services for Medicaid beneficiaries" must be
enrolled as participating providers and, therefore, will
be subject to this requirement 205 The NPI must be
included on any claim for pay ment "that is based upon an
order or reterral of tthe phy sician or other professional"
including pharmacy claims.206 1The application fee
requirement specified in Section 6401(a), as amended
by Section 10603. is also addressed and elucidated
by the final regulation.20 7 The PPACAY requires the
Secretary to impose this fee on institutional prosvideirs,
but excludes cligible professionals such as phy sicians
and nurse practitioners from pay ing the cnrollment
application fee.20 s

The fee will be used to cover

the costs of screening.

It will be imposed the same

"(1) Where any person with an ownership or
control interest or who is an agent or managing
employee of the provider does not submit timely
and accurate disclosure information or fails to
cooperate with all required screening methods;
(2) that are terminated on or after January
1, 2011 by Medicare or any other Medicaid
program or CHIP"'
States are permitted deny eniollment to a pinsvide if
"the prosvider has fal sified any in formation on an
application or if C'MS or the State cannot serify the
identits of the applicant>"' i
In the followsing circumstances, States must deny
enrollment to prosviders unless the State determines
that the denial is not in "the best interests of the Stale's
Medicaid progiram" and puts this in wxriting:219
"(1) Thc prosvider or a person wxith an osvnership
or control interest or who is an agent or
managing employee of the provider fails to
provide accurate informatioi; (2) the prov ider

fails to provide access to the provider's locations
for site visits, or (3) the provider, or any person
with an ownership or control interest, or who is
an agent or managing employee of the provider
has been convicted of a criminal offense related
to that persons involvement in Medicare,
Medicaid, or CHIP in the last 10 years. We
believe that providers can significantly reduce
the likelihood of fraud. waste or abuse by
providing and maintaining timely and accurate
Medicaid enrollment information. We believe
the Medicaid program will be better protected
by not allowing persons with serious criminal
offenses related to Medicare, Medicaid, and
CH11P to serve as providers."220
inder Section 455.420 of the proposed regulation,
once a provider's enrollment is denied or terminated, it
must undergo screening and re-pay all necessary fees
in order to enroll again.221 A provider can appeal these
decisions with any available appeal rights provided
by state laws and regulations.'," All providers must
go through these screening procedures by being
revalidated every five years."
The first revalidation
cycle must be completed by 2015, which will be
accomplished by 20% of providers revalidating each
year starting in 2011.224
Section 6502 of the PPACA required a period exclusion
from Medicaid if an "entity or individual owns,
controls., or manages an entity that: (1) has failed to
repay overpayments during a specified period; (2) is
suspended, excluded, or terminated from participation
in any Medicaid program; or (3) is affiliated with an
individual or entity that has been suspended, excluded,
or terminated from Medicaid participation." 22 5
Importantly, the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders
Act, signed by President Obama on December 15,
2010, repealed this exclusion requirement, which
initially would have taken effect January 1, 2011.226
The final rule clarifies that states must terminate
providers, suppliers, or eligible professionals in cases
xxhere thex "xxcre terminated or had their billing
prixvileges rexvoked for cause xxhich may include,
but is ixot limited to. (i) fraud, (ii) integrity' or (iii)
quality"" unless their billing privileges xxere rexoked
due to the proxvider voluixtarily ending participation iin
the program."tm T his terniination xwould only occur
atter exhaustion ot Medicare program appeal rights or
expiration of the time trame tor state appeal rights.22
Section 6501 of the IPACA adds to die
of Section 6401(b)(2) by establishing
make Medicare and CIIP termination
available to state Medicaid programs.23(

requirenxeixts
a process to
information
States must

report adverse provider actions to CMS, "including
criminal convictions, sanctions, or negative licensure
actions."
Compliance Take-Aways
* The PPACA suggests applying the same
screening, application, and moratorium
requirements that will be used for the
Medicare program to Medicaid and CIE
IUnder the Act, the Secretary is authorized
to make unscheduled unannounced site
visits, including pre-enrollment visits for
prospective and enrolled Medicaid and C1P1
providers.
* Additionally, the PPACA increases the
disclosure and sharing of exclusion,
suspension and termination information
between federal health care programs,
and requires Medicaid exclusion based on
other program exclusions.
The PPAC'A
authorizes denial of enrollment for failure
to provide information or a provider/owner's
conviction of a criminal offense related to
federal health care program involvement.
Additionally, all institutional providers will
be charged an application fee and will have
to provide a National Provider Identifier
on their applications. Physicians ordering
or referring services must enroll in the
Medicaid program as participating providers
with National Provider Identifiers, but they
will not be assessed an application fee.
C. Additional Screening and Payment
Restrictions; Other Compliance and
Enforcement Mechanisms
1. Tenmporaiy Moratoria on Enrollment oftMedicare
Providers and Suppl iers, Vedicaid and CHIP
Providers
PPACA

and the regulations implementing the
legislation alloxx the Secretary to impose a nxoratorium
on enrollment on nexx proxviders and suppliers if
necessary to combat fraud, xxaste, or abuse23
Specifically, CMS may impose a moratoriunx in six
nioixth increixents upon the identification of a trend
of high risk for fraud and abuse for a category of
suppliers and providers or tor a geographic area.3
This could be identified by a dispioportionate number
ot proxviders compaied to the number of beneflciaiies
in an area.' 34 OM S can also inipose such a moratoriuni
if the state has also done so or if coordination with the
HHS OIG or DOJ has resulted in a particular supplier
or provider type or geographic area being identified as

high risk.) A moratorium can be announced by publishing it in the Federal
Register along with other methods and forums "such as press releases,
CMS Provider Open Door Forums, CMS Provider listserys, and on the
CMS provider/supplier enrollment web page."236 Notice that a moratorium
is being lifted is also published in the federal Register.37
Medicare contractors are directed to deny enrollment applications for
providers or suppliers subject to a moratorium.23
The enrollment
moratorium can be extended in six month increments. If an entity is
covered by a temporary moratorium, including one imposed due to the
geographic area, its application for enrollment will be denied."O' the entity
has a right to an administrative appeal to challenge a moratorium up to the
H111S
Departmental Appeals loard level of review, but there is no right to
judicial review of the temporary moratorium.240
States also have the authority to impose "noratoria, numerical caps, and
other limits" for providers identified as high risk.241 The state Medicaid
agency must comply with a temporary moratorium unless it can get an
exception by demonstrating that it would adversely affect a beneficiary's
access to medical assistance1.24 Ouse an exception, the state must provide
written details of such adverse impact.243
2. Sunetision ofPaynents
The PPACA requires the suspension of pay ments pending an investigation
of a credible allegation of fraud unless the 11S Secretary determines
there is good cause.24 A prior rule (December 2, 1996) authorizes the
suspension of payments if overpayment, fraud or willful misrepresentation
4
is shown through reliable information.2 5
IThe final rule defines a credible allegation of fraud to include "an allegation
from any source, including but not limited to fraud hotline complaints,
claims data mining, patterns identified through provider audits, civil false
claims cases, and Iav enforcement investigations."246 Allegations should
be verified to determine if they have indicia of reliability.24 -CMS or its
contractors must look at the facts on a case by case basis and take into
account the potential impact of a suspension on a provider.2
CMS or
a contractor must consult with OIG or DOJ regarding the existence of a
credible allegation of fraud before suspending payments.249 CMS has
discretion to impose a suspension, and "good cause" exceptions and
requests by law enforcement can come into play. Good cause exceptions
allow CMS to take into account the obstructions to beneficiary access that
can result from a suspension or if the suspension is not in the best interests
of the Medicare program.250 Every 180 days after a suspension is initiated
based on a credible allegation ot fraud, an exaluation must be conducted to
determine swhethei there is good cause not to continue the suspension.25
IThis evaluation wxill include requesting ceitification torm GIG or another
lasx enforcement agency rcgarding sxhcther it continues to investigate this
matter. 25 If a SUSpension has been in effect for eighteen months, good
cause wxill be deenmed to cxist not to suspend piiymcnts unless certain
conditions are met."
IThe proposed regulation also distinguishes betxween the piotocols for
dealing sxith oxerpayments veisus credible allegations of Iaud. Absent
a credible allegation of fraud, CMS may "take timely action" to make an
overpayment determination.254 Upon making the determination, CMS will
provide notice and the payment suspension subsequently will be lifted. If

a credible allegation of fraud is involved, CMS rmay delay providing the
determination notice and lifting the suspension until the resolution of the
investigation.2
The investigation of a credible allegation of fraud does not have to originate
in or with a law enforcement agency.56 The regulation clarifies that a state
agency investigation (e.g., by a state Medicaid agency program integrity
unit) is sufficient to trigger paymient suspension. A state will not receive
reimbursement through Federal Financial Participation (FFP1l), unless
good cause exists not to suspend a provider under these circumstances.257
Additionally, a state may not claim FFP for payments that are suspended."
States are also required to report and retain information related to suspensions
and fraud referrals. IThe implementing regulations expand upon methods
by wxhich information regarding investigations and credible allegations of
fraud should be shared between state and federal agencies, law enforcement
entities, and Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs).259 MFCUs may
refer providers to the state agency in order to suspend payments if there is a
credible allegation of fraud..20 The regulation clarifies that such a referral
must be in writing to create an audit trail, but there is no "substantive right
upon which a provider [may] lodge [an] objection or ... legal challenge ...
[based on a claim that] ... proper procedures were not folloswed.""'
D Ethics and Compliance Programs
Section 6102 of the PPACA imposes an ethics and compliance program
requirement on nursing facilities (NFs) and skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs). NFs and SNFs need to establish these compliance programs in
a manner that effectively prevents and detects violations and promotes
quality of care.6 2 Ihe PIPACA also requires NFs and SNFs to collect and
disclose to the 11IS Secretary information about ownership and control of
the facilities.263
Pursuant to Section 6401(a) of the PPACA, Medicare, Medicaid and
CHIP must establish compliance programs that contain certain 'core
elements."2 Compliance program requirements were not finalized by the
February 2nd Final Rule because CMS intends to do further rulemaking
with regard to these requirements.265 Additionally, the agency intends to
conduct extended rulemaking on the compliance program requirements.,
subsequent to the final rule. The proposed and final regulations suggest
using Chapter 8 of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual as a
model for the seven core elements of the required compliance programs
for Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP enrollment. These guidelines include.
but are not limited to the following: written policies and procedures for
fraud detection; designation of a chief compliance officer, using reasonable
cfforts to cxclude indisviduals from an organization's substantial authority
pcrsonael if the organization knewv or should hasve kuowvn they cngagcd in
illegal or imiproper conduct; audits and esvaluation~ techniques to moonitor
specific problems; maintaining a means such as a hotline to receise
complaints and creating procedures to preserse complainant anonynmity to
presvent retaliation against swhistleblowxers; establishing a response sy steam
foi allegations of improper conduct and followxing up xxith appropiiate
disciplinary action against violators of internal andti edeial rules and
requiremxents; and insvestigation and memediation of identified sy stenmic
problems, including modifications to compliance and ethics programs.> 6
IThe final rule also seeks comments on the degree to which affected
entities have already incorporated the elements of the guidelines into their

compliance programs and business operations.26 Additionally, CMS
requests feedback on other suggestions for compliance program elements,
and the costs and benefits and systems necessary to achieve compliance. 5
Other matters on which the agency seeks comment include: measures of
effectiveness of these compliance programs; use of third party resources to
monitor compliance versus the use of staff; and a reasonable timeframe for
the establishment of the required compliance program.>69

T he PACA also includes requirements to establish compliance programs
that apply to NFs, SNFs. Medicare. Medicaid and CH4IP The core elements
of these compliance programs will be established through subsequent
CMS rulemaking. The PICA expands the use of MACs and RACs to
identify and enforce laws against fraud and abuse. These changes allow for
unlimited prepayment reviews by MACs and RAC expansion to Medicare
Parts C and ). The PPNCA subjects more conduct, including conduct
related to screening and enrollment, to CMPs.

E. Medicare Administrative Contractors and Recovery Audit
Contractors
The PRCA also expands other fraud identification and enforcement
mechanisms.
For instance, Medicare Administrative Contractors
(MACs) can conduct pre-payment reviews witIthout being subject to prior
limitations.270 The Recovery Audit Contractor (RAG) Program will be
expanded to Medicaid, Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Parts C
and D by December 31, 2010.2n RACs will have to review claims for
reinsurance payments and estimated enrollment costs under Part D, and
anti-fraud plans that MA and Part D plans are required to have by the
PPACA.272

The PPACA imposes a yearly reporting requirement on drug, device,
biological and medical supply manufacturers starting on March 31, 2013.
The report needs to be submitted to the IHIS Secretary on the 90th day
of each year. The report must include specific information pertaining to
The
'payments and other transfers of value to 'cov ered recipients."'
term "coxvered recipients" applies to physicians (unless they are employed
by the manufacturer) and teaching hospitals. The PPACA provides detailed
information on the types of payments required to be reported,"i and
includes several exceptions and exclusions to this reporting requirement. 28 2

F. Civil Monetary Pealties

A. New Disclosure Obligations for Certain Health Care Entities

More conduct related to screening and enrollment could lead to civil
monetary penalties under the PPACA. CMPs can be issued for failing to
provide timely access to the HHS OIG or for providing false or intentionally
incomplete information on an enrollment application or contract to provide
services under a federal health care program271 Additionally, ordering
or prescribing medical items and services while excluded can subject a
provider to CMPs.274IThe CMs that can be issued range from $15,000 per
day (for failure to grant access) to $50,000 per violation.275

The PPACA requires disclosure of certain investment information by
manufacturers and group purchasing organizations (GPOs) and authorizes
the imposition of CMPs ranging fron $I ,000 to $1,000,000 for unreported
interests or transfers of value.28 The information that must be disclosed
includes investment interests held by physicians unless they are in a
publicly traded security or in a mutual fund.284 Beginning January 1,
2012, the PPIACA xwill preempt state laws that require these manufacturer
disclosures. ' State laws that require different disclosures or reporting
from different entities would not likely be preempted; as such, not all
disclosure and reporting requirements founded in state law are necessarily
preempted.286

The PPACA creates exceptions that specify when conduct potentially
falling under the Beneficiary Inducement Lass would not be subject to a
CMP.
The Beneficiary Inducement Law applies to situations involving
"the offering of remuneration to any beneficiary that the 'person knows or
should know is likely to influence such individual to order or receive from
a particular provider, practitioner or supplier any itein or service' payable
under Medicare or Medicaid."2n
These exceptions apply in circumstances that involve providing access to
care with low risk of harm to patients; applying coupons, rebates or rewards
from a retailer, providing items and services for those in financial need if
certain criteria are met to prove that it is done in good faith and not as part
of a solicitation; or vxaising the "first fill' copayrnenot for a generic drug
by a prescription drug plan oi sponsor under Medicare Part D oi an MA
oiganization offering an MAN-PD under Part C.7
For assuring compliance, CMS may impose a moratorium on enrollment
either for proxviders or geographic areas identified as high risk or in
coordination xwith 01IG and 1)0. The IRCAN also requires suspension
of pay meats pending an insvestigation of a "credible allegation of fraud.
Blefoie imposing a suspension. CMS or a contiactor is~obligated to consult
vxith OIG or 1)0J. Good cause exceptions or requests by laws entorcement
max be factored in wxhen determining whether to grant a suspension. States
will report suspension information to the HHS Secretary on an annual basis.

B. Medicare Advantage and Part D Plans
Section 6408 of the PPACA enhances protections and prohibitions against
marketing violations by Medicare Advantage and Part I) plans."m Conduct
prohibited by the PPACA includes: enrolling and transferring without
consent, failing to comply with the established restrictions on marketing
and employing individuals who engage in sanctioned conduct."m CMPs
are authorized by the section of the Social Security Act amended by this
prosvision of the PPACA. Additionally, Section 6408 allows the Secretary to
inmpose C MPs on employ ees or agents of MA and Pai't D plans or prosviders
or suppliers wsho contract wxith themn if they engage in othser conduct
specified by Section 6408, such as Inaking false statements or claims and
t 2
delay ing inspections.
In a final rule published on April 15, 2010, CMS resised regulatios
pertaining to Medicare Advantage and Part D Plans and described the
ieqtuired elements of an effective compliance program.29() In SctionS
422.503(b)(4)(vi) and § 423.504(b)(4)(v i), CMS prosvided guidance
regarding wshat constitutes an 'effectise" compliance plan. Specifically,
the regulation outlines sexven required elemnents that should be included in a
compliance plan. Sponsoring organizations should have:

1. Written policies and procedures describing
commitment to compliance with federal
and state standards.
Internal guidance
should reflect and explain this commitment.
Compliance issues and how they should
be investigated and resolved should be
communicated to employees, along with a
policy of non-intimidation and retaliation."91
2. A compliance officer employed by the
sponsoring organization, parent organization
or a corporate affiliate, and a committee
accountable to senior management. Both
the compliance officer and committee must
annually report to the governing body, which
must exercise oversight and effectively
implement the compliance program. 292
3. An effective training and education program
on prevention of fraud, waste and abuse.
This should include annual training and
be included as a part of new employee
orientation. Meeting the fraud, waste, and
abuse training requirements for enrollment in
the Medicare program is sufficient to satisf§
this requirement. 3
4. Effective lines of communication that are
confidential and allow for compliance issues
to be reported anonymously and in good faith
as issues are identified. 294
5. Well-publicized disciplinary guidelines to
enforce standards.'.
6. Procedures for routine internal monitoring
and internal and external auditing to identify
compliance risks. Audits should include the
sponsoring organizations first tier entities.2 96
7. Procedures in place to ensure prompt
response to detected offenses. This includes
investigating potential problems identified in
audits and self-evaluations and procedures to
correct these probleIs quickly and ensure
continued compliance. 2 97
C. Multiple FEmployer Welfare Arrangemnts
Subtitle (G of the PPACA includes additional
program integrity proxvisions that apply to [RISA
plans and Multiple Employ er Welfare Arrangements
(ME WAs).29813y amending 1ERISAY the PPACAX
subjects employees and agents of MEAs to criminal
penalties for including certain false information in
marketing materials.' 9 The Act also amends ERISA
to give the Secretary of Labor authority to issue

orders that would bring MVEWAs under state fraud
and abuse laws and would allow the Labor Secretary
to shut down MEWA operations and seize plan assets
in certain fraud and abuse and financially perilous
circumstances."oo Additionally. the PRCAX authorizes
the Secretary of ILabor to promulgate a regulation that
creates an evidentiary privilege pertaining to certain
state and federal official communications related to
fraud and abuse investigations.'
Section 6603 of
the PPACA specifies a process by which the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) will
be asked to develop a reporting form that can be used
by private insurance issuers to report suspected fraud
to state insurance departments and agencies.30'
D. Health Benefit Plans and PBMs
The PPACA requires specific disclosures from
drug manufacturers, authorized distributors, health
benefit plans, and PBMs.303 Starting in April 2012,
drug manufacturers and authorized distributors must
submit identify ing and quantity information related
to drug samples.04 Flealth benefit plans and PBMs
that contract with Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors.,
MA Organizations and qualified health plans will be
required to provide certain information indicative of
negotiated prices and discounts to these plans and
to HHS.105 The plans, PBMs and prices will not
be identifiable since this information will be kept
confidential.306
Io assure compliance, the PGACA imposes annual
reporting requirements on drug, device, biological
and medical supply manufacturers beginning March
31, 2013. Manufacturers and GPOs must disclose
investment interests held by physicians unless they are
in a publicly traded s.ecurity or mutual fund. Pursuant
to the PPACA, drug manufacturers, authorized
distributors, health benefit plans, and PBMs must
submit identifying and quality information related to
drug samples. Certain health benefit plans and PBSMs
that contract with PD plans and sponsors will be
required to proxvide information related to negotiated
prices and discounts.
Coinpliance Take-Aways
* CMN'
Smay impose a moratorium on enrollment
either for proxiders or a geographic area in
coordination wxith OIG~ and D)OJ or identified
as high risk.
* Thc PPACA also requires suspension of
pay meats pending an investigation of a
"credible allegation of fraud." The Act also
includes requirements to establish compliance
programs that apply to NFs, SNFs, Medicare,

Medicaid and CIEl Core elements of these
compliance programs will be established
through subsequent rulemaking.
* Under the PPACA, the use of MACs and
RACs to identify and enforce laws against
fraud and abuse are expanded.
These
changes allow for unlimited prepayment
reviews by sMACs and RAC expansion to
Medicare Parts C and I.
* The Act makes more conduct, including
conduct related to screening and enrollment,
subject to CMPs.

As noted in Part III D above, Section 6102 of the
PPACA imposes an ethics and compliance program
requirement on nursing facilities (NFs) and skilled
nursing facilities (SNFs).307 NFs and SNFs need
to establish these compliance programs in a manner
that effectively prevents and detects violations and
promotes quality of care.308

classifications such as registered nurses, licensed
professionals, and other medical staff).15
In order to carry out these reporting requirements
successfully, the PPACA directs the Secretary to
develop a program to report direct care staffing and
other auditable data.31
The PPACA also requires
to the Comptroller General of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study and
report on the Five-Star Quality Rating System for
nursing homes.3"
he Secretary must also establish
a demonstration project directed toward establishing
a national independent monitor program to oversee
chains of SNFs and NFs, and a quality assurance and
performance program for chain and individual SNFs
and NFs.31
In sum, the PPACA requires SNFs and NFs to establish
compliance programs that prevent and detect fraud.
IThey also must maintain and disclose intormation
related to ownership and control to the Secretarx Fifty
percent CMP reductions are authorized for SNFs and
NFs that promptly self-report and correct deficiencies.
The PPACA also imposes reporting requirements on
staff wage and benefit expenditures.

The PPACA also requires NFs under Medicaid
and SNFs under Medicare to maintain specified Compliance Take-Aways
information about ownership and control of the
* The PPACA requires SNFs and NFs to
facilities and disclosable parties."o' This information
establish compliance programs that prevent
must be disclosed to the 1111S Secretary, the HH11S
and detect fraud. They also must maintain
01G, the states or a state long-term care ombudsman if
and disclose information on ownership and
requested.' 10 bThrough amendments in Section 6402,
control to the Secretary.
the Secretars is directed to enter agreements allowing
* Fifty percent CMP reductions are authorized
sharing and matching of claims and payment data to
identifm fraud, waste, and abuse through the Integrated
for SNFs and NFs that promptly self-report
Data Repository of CMS."
and correct deficiencies. The PPACA also
imposes reporting requirements related to
TFhe Act also imposes various reporting and disclosure
staff wage and benefit expenditures.
requirements on SNFs and NFs and provides
direction to the IllHS Secretary with regard to use
VL~, Accunabl PCrOranizations and
of the information, including: publishing staffing
Fraud P\revent "11in
data. state survey and certification programs, a
Section 3022 of the PPACA requires the Secretary
model standardized complaint form,"' information
to establish a "shared saxving" program bx January
regarding successful complaints, and intormation
1, 2012. The goal of this program is to promote
about adjudicatcd criamal xviolations by facilities or
accountability
for patients, coordination of scrv ices,
staff on a Nursing Home Conmparc Website.31 As an
inentiv e, the PPAC A authorizes reduction of civil and efficient dclixvery of quality care.319 Accountablc
monetary penalties by 500% for certain SN Is and Carc Organizations (ACOs) comprised of groups of
prosviders ol serxvices and suppliers xxill be formed
N~s that promptly self-report and correct deficiencies
xwithin ten day s alter a penalty is imposed. Pursuant under the shared saxvings program to "manage
to the Act, the Secretaiy must also issue regulations 1o and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-serxvice
320
establish an informal dispute resolution process alter a beneficiaries'
314
penalty is imposed.

SNFs must report wage and benefit expenditures
divided into separate categories for distinct staff

To receixve pay ments from the Secrctary undcr thc
shared savings progran, ACOs must meet quality
performance standards.321 ACOs can be comprised
of professionals in a group practice, networks

of individual practices, and partnerships or joint ventures, but each
arrangement must establish a system of shared governance and meet certain
criteria established by the Secretary.322

monopolistic entities.33 For example, CMS could still enforce the Stark
law in a manner consistent with its intent, but that would still allox for the
formation of ACOs.338

The PPACA-designated requirements for ACOs include, but are not limited
to: accountability for cost and overall care of beneficiaries demonstrated
through reporting on quality and cost measures; a formal legal structure
alloxing for payment distribution, "patient centeredness" criteria; and
sufficient primary care professionals for the number of Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries.32 3 Additionally, an ACO must have a leadership and
management structure, including clinical and administrative systems, and
must provide information regarding participating professionals.32 ACOs
are required to enter an agreement with the Secretary to participate in the
shared savings program for at least three years. 2I

The American Health Lawyers Association's (AHLA) Public Interest
Committee recently suggested several waiver proposals along with an
assessment of their benefits and associated risks in a recent article, entitled:
"Waivers tUnder the Medicare Shared Savings Program: An Outline of
Options".(hereinafter "Ihe Outline"). 3 I he Outline suggests several
innovative options for resolving pending questions related to how fraud
and abuse laws will apply to ACO formation, governance, and shared
savings payments. Specifically., the Outline addresses possible waivers
and applications of the follow ing laws: the Civil Monetary Penalty ILaw
Prohibition on Payments to Reduce or Limit Care, 42 U.S.C. 1320a 7a(b),340
the Beneficiary Inducement Prohibition, 42 U.S.C. 1320a 7a(a)(5),341 the
Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn7, the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.
1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2),343 and Prohibitions Against Charging or Collecting
More Than the Medicare Allow able, 42)US.C.1320a-7a(a)(2).344

Shared savings paid to an ACO should be based on the percentage
difference betw een the average per capita expenditures for Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries for Part A and 13 services, and a benchmark.326
The legislation leaves it to the iHIHS Secretary to decide the percentage these
expenditures must be below the benchmark Ior the purpose of determining
payments. Additionally, the applicable benchmark will be established by
the Secretary for an agreement period and will be adjusted for beneficiary
characteristics. "8 The amount of shared savings that are paid to a particular
ACO can also be limited by the Secretary.'
The Secretary can monitor
ACOs to make sure they are not avoiding at-risk patients and can impose
sanctions or terminate an agreement if quality standards are not met.330
The PPACA also grants a substantial amount of authority to the Secretary
to determine whether ACOs meet the specified requirements and continue
to comply with them. Further, the PPACA explicitly states that there will
be no administrative or judicial review of the following ACO matters:
determination of criteria for eligibility for shared savings; assessment
of quality care; assignment of beneficiaries to ACOs: determination of
whether anACO is eligible for shared savings; and the percentage or limits
of shared savings; or termination.331
Additionally, the HHS Secretary has waiver authority with respect to certain
fraud and abuse laws to establish ACOs that comply with the PPACA
requirements. " This authority has been the subject of much debate, as
government agencies try to determine in what contexts and to what extent
it should be applied to ensure that ACOs provide quality care and protect
patients while achieving cost savings and coordination of care.333 Another
subject of recent discussion is how to strike the correct balance between
encouiaging coordination ot caie thiough ACOs without incentixviing
antitrust xviolations or rexwaiding monopolistic behaxvior.33
In a recent goxvemrnent-sponsored woi'kshop, high ranking officials from
(MS, tHHS OIG, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTIC) grappled
xxith these issues and sought conmmeitts from proxvider representatixves and
adxvocates regarding the use and application of the xxaixver authority, and
possible safe harbors and anti-trust exceptions to be established.
Duing
the workshop, paiticipants discussed xway s to claiify hoxx anti-trust iules. the
Stark laxx. and the anti-kickback statute xwouild apply to ACOs.33t IThe goal
xxas to promote goxvemrnent coordination to create a regulatorx fmamcxwoi'k
that would allow for innovative business arrangements that would achieve
the coordination of care intended by the PPACA, but would also prevent
bad actors from seeking to misuse the shared savings program to create

T-he AL A Committee explained that these laws increase legal risk in
forming, governing and managing ACOs and, therefore, the HHS Secretary
should consider using the PPACA's waiver authority to clarify how these
laws will be applied to AC Os. The Outline analyzes the pros and cons of
various possible waivers, and also compares the potential benefits and costs
of these with maintaining the status quo on application of the fraud and
abuse laxxs. The AHLA Committee proposed several innovative waivers,
but emphasizes that creating certain exemptions from these regulations - in
the context of ACO fornmation, governance, and the distribution of patient
management fees and shared savings payments- would encourage ACO
formation by Ilim iting certain legal risks and allowing for nore coordination.
Waivers also could allow incentives to encourage physicians to change
conduct to lower costs, while preserving quality, by giving them a stake in
shared savings. The outline also addressed the potential risks and negative
consequences arising from broader waivers or changes to the status quo,
which could prevent the fraud and abuse laws from providing the patient/
beneficiary protections that they were enacted to achieve. Some risk could
be mitigated by limited waivers applying only to ACOs, since ACOs are
still subject to perormance standards.
The proposals in the Outline include both "global" and specific waivers.
For instance, the AHLA Committee proposed that the HHS Secretary could
maintain the general status quo on the application of all the fraud and abuse
laxvs, and then rely on case-by -case anal>ysis to exercise w aixver authority
on a discretionary basis, thereby alloxxing ACOs to seek guidance through
advisory opinions3 4 5I ils would alloxw continuiity of enforcement ot these
laws and ensure that they are applied fullx in the ACO0 context. The authors
point out, hoxxever, that AC Cs present some nexx and unique questions that
xvould still haxve to be resolxved.
As an alternatixve, the Secretary could establish a process foi proxviders
0wxaixver prior to tformation, andi rexview airrangements
to apply foi an ACO
submitted by each applicant and grant xxaivers it PPACA criteria and
prior legal requirements arc satisfied.346 The application process could be
modeled after the OIG advisory opinion process, but could be modified or
expedited to encourage ACO formation. 4 7 This would allow individual
assessments of risk without changing existing fraud and abuse laws, but

would likely be costly and time consuming for both the government and
applicants.348
The AHLA Committee's proposals related to the Civil Monetary Penalty
Lass Prohibition on Payments to Reduce or Limit Care, 42 Ut.S.C.
§ 1320a-7a(b), focused on the way the anti-kickback statute could stand in
the way of ACO shared saving distributions and patient management tees
that would incentivize physician involvement in the process of reducing
costs while providing quality care. At issue is trying to find the right
balance between giving physicians a stake in the goal of reducing costs,
without creating incentives that would limit services to the extent that
patients would not be receiving necessary care.349
Proposals ranged from completely prohibiting hospital payments, to
physicians to reduce or limit care, to a blanket waiver exempting shared
savings distributions and patient management fees from being considered
payments to reduce or limit care.350 A middle-road approach proposed
is a waiver that would state "the statutory prohibition is only triggered
3
if the payment is made to reduce or limit "medically necessary' care." 5
Although this provides a compromise, the fact that 'medically necessary'
is not a clearly defined term leaves room for further debate about which
distributions would have the effect of limiting 'medically necessary'
treatment. Therefore, it does not assure that the waiver would actually
provide the clear rule regarding the application of the statute in the ACO
context.
The Outline also proposed other waiver options that would reduce
statutory prohibitions on ACO patient management fees and shared savings
payments that would apply to circumstances in which the Stark law, the
anti-kickback statute, or prohibitions against charging or collecting more
than the Medicare allowable (i.e., the prohibition on balanced billing)
would be implicated. Generally, the waiver options exempt these laws
from the ACO context to allow ACO's to provide some financial incentives
through these distributions to physicians, so as to encourage them to change
conduct and focus on quality performance at lower costs. Determining how
this exemption is tailored will be essential to ensure that the waiver does
not eviscerate the safeguards for independent clinical judgment and patient
protections from inappropriately limiting care provided by these laws.52
One innovative waiver proposal on the Stark law posits: if ACOs
incorporate certain standards, they would not create a financial relationship
under Stark, provided that remuneration is transferred to develop and create
governance structures for ACOs, distribute patient management fees or
shared saxvings.3 TIhis xaixer ould be contingent on ACOs adhering to
certain sateguards, including: linmitations on shared saxvings paxyments to
proxviders; required disclosures of AGO financial incentixves to beneflciaries;
other options (non-ACO> prov iders) to beneficiaries: and quaility of care
standards.354 This prosvides a fairly narrowv, defined xxaisver that 55ould
allows for certain distributions to gixve phy sicians a stake in the AGO's
effectixveness, and, as the AHLA Commsittee pointed out, the AGO xxould
still hasve to comply wsith performance standards.35 Apply ing the xxaixver
to distributing patient management fees and shared saxvings xxould further
diminish concerns by proxviding an exven nsore defined scope, thereby
limiting the xsaixver to a defined ACO management issue. The exemption
for formation and governance purposes may make it overly broad and
unnecessarily increase the risk of improper payments to phy sicians.

With respect to the Beneficiary Inducement Prohibition, the Outline
presents a few options, including maintaining the status quo or allowing
ACOs to offer remuneration to beneficiaries with certain specified
safeguards. The considerations on how this law applies to ACOs involve
balancing the PPACA goal of coordination and clinical integration with
protections against "buying patient loyalty. '356 Proponents of providing
ACO exemptions from the Beneficiary Inducement Law argue that the
risk of potentially inappropriate incentives could still be mitigated through
ACO performance standards.'
The argument for continued application
and enforcement of the regulation in the ACO context is that relaxing the
rule could discourage selecting the best qualified providers."' Also, it is
not clear xxhether this exemption is needed to achieve ACO and PPACA
objectives.359
The Outline also discusses the challenges and opportunities presented by
the various ways the PPACA-authorized .waiver authority could be applied
to ACOs. The range of proposals provided, as well as the positive and
negative considerations associated with the different options, highlight
the conflicting interests and protections at stake. Broader waivers provide
clarity and incentivize private investment in ACO formation, but may
compromise beneficiary protections. Narrower waivers that may require
more case-by-case analysis allow the fraud and abuse laws to continue to
provide necessary protections. With enough "fine tuning," these narrower
waivers should provide the exemptions necessary to meet the challenges
arising out of coordinating care, forming ACOs, and incentivizing
physicians to change conduct to meet retorm goals.
In sun, ACOs are arrangements comprised of groups of providers of
services and suppliers to manage and coordinate care for fee-for-service
beneficiaries. IThey can be formed by entering a three-year agreement with
the 1111S Secretary to participate in a shared savings program. Various
arrangements of professionals and practices cans be used -to frm an ACO,
but they must establish a system of shared governance, and meet certain
criteria and quality and performance standards established by the Secretary.
Specifically, they must be accountable (as demonstrated by quality and cost
reporting), have a formal legal structure allowing for payment distribution,
and be patient-centered. The HHS Secretary has authority to determine
whether ACOs meet and comply with the necessary requirements.
Additionally, the Secretary can waive fraud and abuse laws for the purpose
of establishing ACOs.
Coipliance Takeaiways Related to ACOs
*AGOs are arrangenments comprised of groups of prosviders of
serxvices and suppliers to msanage and coordinate care for fee-forsersvice beneficiaries. They can be fornsed by entering a three-year
agreenment wxitl the Secretar'y to participate in a shared saxvigs
prograns. Various arraisgements of professionals and practices
cans be used to form an ACO0 but they must establish a sy stens
of shared goxvernance, and nmeet ceitain criteria and quiality and
peitormnance standaids established by the Secretary.
*Specifically, they must be accountable (as densonstrated by
quality aisd cost reportiing), hasve a formal legal structure alloswing
for paynent distribution, and be patient-centered.

* 1he IllHIS Secretary has the authority to determine whether ACOs
meet and comply with the necessary requirements. Additionally,
the Secretary can waive fraud and abuse laws for the purpose of
establishing ACts.
VIL Cn
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Although many PPACA fraud and abuse prevention provisions include
innovative solutions, modifications made by these provisions and the
regulations promulgated to implement them are firmly grounded in
precedent and successfully complete prior efforts at regulatory reform. For
instance, by establishing a clear scienter standard, the PPACA codifies the
position taken by several federal courts in interpreting the level of intent
required by the federal anti-kickback statute.3601The PPACA's clarification
that anti-kickback violations can trigger False Claims Act liability confirms
that legal theories previously accepted by federal courts, such as the implied
certification theory, establish this link. The PPACA's requirements related
to identification, reporting, and return of overpayments have been included
in prior proposed regulations and establish a clear rule, which should make
compliance and enforcement more predictable.
The PPACA also includes new approaches to screening and enrollment
designed to initiate a shift towards focusing on fraud and abuse prevention
along with enforcement. The Act accomplishes this by integrating
knowledge of risk areas and applying higher levels of scrutiny to these
areas in order to weed out bad actors prior to enrollment and payment. This
represents an innovative approach aimed at saving government resources.
New models designed to achieve the PPACA's goals on incentivizing
arrangements that provide higher quality care at lower costs will demand
new understandings and applications of regulations and safe harbors. For
these reasons, the PPACA clearly defines the requirements for forming
accountable care organizations that can participate in the shared savings
program.
T-he PPACA's fraud and abuse provisions exemplify efforts to establish
a clearer regulatory framework that will ultimately move the health care
system towards better approaches to preventing misuse of government

resources. The provisions are designed to ensure that the federal health
programs can maximize their funds to pay for necessary treatment and
access to health care.
Implementing the changes and working towards the reforms specified
in the PPA\CA will require coordination among government agencies,
prosviders, and payers; further clarification through rulemaking: a continued
commitment to enforcement; and cireation and achievement of policy
solutions. This enldeaxvor should be approached wvith the realization that
the goal of proxviding greater aces~s to health care wshile educing eosts and
incentixvizing better quality is not an easy task. but a necessary one.

ta.s11Z,_'~1 ',Iile4(iigh b - ,_ ,III-18
rn
-4 STMN lsp ote 4, at 9; 31 U_,S.C , 3730(e)(4)(b),,
S31 U
§.C 3730(e)(4)(b),(2;
aSoilScrt
ct§12Aa(0)Q
.C f
47 See
STMA,
up
ote 4, at 10. See also Cranie et at., supra
ote 6, at 3,
( q
n -l20-21, ciinluby L. No, 11-148 alo 10 104(-Ij)(2); co
dat. 31U.iSkC §
FIEO(mmu G-- _
-'S
_
&S-.,
37:30(e)(4),
0 a.M
* e Puh L Nol, 111-148 § 6402(a), codfied at Social Security Act, 4211.a26
U_, .SC,A, § 1128-5(d),
,*"
a.2 -7
"' The Patient Protection an
~dbeCare Act, Pu1b, L . 111-148alk, §
2U..§19m()1()~ )kt0_)
640(al) (codified as am-- en,,ded, at Social Security Act 1 28J(d.), 42 (_JS,(C,_ §
1320a- 7j(d)), Ae al.i-so Caeet al., seqa
ote 4-J, at 7,HUA
LPEIA.DSA)IE
Sehe David O'"Brien, Christine Rinn, & B3,ob Roth, MiMght ine Been
3,,,200

siFadEfreetand Recove/-ry Act of 2009 (FEI_'RA), Pub. LO. 111h
1
etrfo
at
:l. 31
3 Ugl
1J(codified29.
(vl3729)4"jr
i,'-SlesC
makes,,,
rAvdes
21 4\,l)()(14(a)(1)(B)
Uses, or causes to be mnade or used, a false record or statemient material to
anl obliga \itiona to pa rtransmit monley or, prope_ rty to the Gvrmnor
S-I".
knlowin-gly coniceals or kowigl
and im--pr-operly avoids or decreases an
4
t3
o)bligAioni to p~ay or transmnit money or- property to the Goverarnent
Medicare Prolgramt-; Repor~wtin-g an.id Repa,.,ym--ent of Overpayments, 67 fend. IIh148
Reg& 3662, 3663 (proqposed an 25, 2002),
R.
Idat 3662,
5 idi" at ,3662-63,JT,1,a.2
i at 3663,
14,/ at 3 66 3,
Id, atk 3662-63. See also Roubert'W Liles, PoiesShudEecs
Cautionl Wh-enl HandlingOeryetsMr
than- Likely, Youtl Can'~t Keep
6
1
Ito Even if' the Plavor Doesn't Want it Back," (July 15, 2010), Irttp:Iwww:t
healtheaeaorny
po/tg/pACA
" Sara A. Kpuft andKarein S"Lovitch,"hf
GmiaoCagd
Mei aread Medcd Ovepayments" (Sept. 1, 2010), http:Iwwwvwmintzm

ailTLvnonA
le etrt)IJat
k
ltp"[K"3ynowingly
auolhh
i
i-t - t5
l,
,Caee
_oe12
Cae
t a,
xA2,§60()

a

fu

ile8,at2

911
0m

a
t 5

4,

0

11

dat 4,

61

Idt at 80.m

64

It

at 8a

Liesumnte 57,2
riyn ote 4, at 8,

61 See Crane et al
61

seado

, ,

SCrane et aL., sqanote 4, ,at 3-4k
oIdat 49m
6i J
Id,4 at

lit.",at5

a

it

11; at 8

aeidat8

(ciingPb. L. No. I1 111,

§6402(d)(2) coie

tSocwial

Secu-rity Act ;j 112Aa(0 (42 Ui,.SC, § 1320,a-7\a(a:)(1 0)),
6q Se id, a:,t 8 (citinlg Pubh L- No, I111-- 148, 6502 cdeatSect'ion-

"0
0
0

1902(a) offthle Social Security Act (42 U_,S,,C 1396al(a)), as amnenrded by
section, 6410,,1(b), new parangrap1h (78)),}.ay
70 OFEO)FINSPECTOR1 GEN., US

EP

OF HEMlEH SZ k--iMAN Sa,_Rvlyorepiidlgcotrpits

R DMPORNwPHiYSICIANSAvnNoMDCM

AND EDIAD

RU

AND

ta
11

ti~
a,

etol 42ote1PCAtsutlsii
edi
rtrigoerll-c~
yteltrof:(1 ledt
l~e kedt
n v-lcl'' fe
Nl i a dniid
u
Jf:p I abAtl- hic lhoe- cso
upireetmia1 ullit
icouem
h

r(

tesrie"Medicare Prga;Payment Policies Under the Physicin Fee
Schedule a-nd Other Revisions to) Part B3 fOr CYA
20 11; Proposed Rule; 75 Fed.
Re.40,14-1 (proposed July 13, 2010),
" See P1ub, L. No. 111 -14, sup

Hsia
7240

l ,nw,_tSse-,

5Fd

e

cie[an-i~tSse _ 51Cl

4

e

note 2, at § 60 0 3(a),Iat7MOsea, loo

Medicare Pirogram; Payment Policies Unrdeir the Phy-, .sicia~n -Fee Schedule po
ani-d Other Revisions to Part B3 fOr CY 2011, 75 Fed, Reg, 73,170k 73,443-47HoptlOpain
(Nw29, 2010) ,712,1
he id, at 73,A443-47,
Ael
Id

rs- e"tv
nce3at,

yN1li)

rsen
e ly

Tum,
cie[an-i.t ytn_ 51Cl

e

,d t72, -13

atd 731-45,
5

a 71,446,
Pub, L No), 1111-148§ 6003(a),
MeiaePrga;Pymuent Policies Udrthe Physician, Flee Schedule
aond, Other Reson
to Part B for CY" 2011; Proposed Rule (July3 1:3, 20 10),
7 5 Fd. Re g, a t 4 0,2 36, 410, 141
SSee Meae
Pirogrami-'-; Payment Policies Unrdeir the Physician Fee
Schdue ndOthr evsinsto PatB fbor CY_
201-1; Proposed Rule (Nov,
29%2010), 75 Fled, Reg,.,at 73,447,
JnoId aat 7,3,,445,Mdcr
,,,1-i at 731,447,

d dt71,41
5

Seeid7

" SeCaeealsup~m note 4, at 6 (koutlin, -ing thie cl.haniges tlhat theS

el ,d[7
1La

"~~~Mraol
Hospital Outaten
Medicareon
Prspctv
ProramPayenSyte

2444

16il

d
eiaoI
diinlSreigApio:dm I~c,'f-rpnr
i

PPA.'CA makes to th1 reten0f1hsiinwwe
hospitals includinig a ban,
subject to two exceptions, from participation in Medicare a.n~dnew reportm--,gZ,
adcmlac
rules),111,Mkt
* eiaeProgram; C',hainges to- the Hospital Outpatient Prospective
Paiym
-ent System ando CY 2010 Paymnt Rae:Chne
Surgical C".e-nter P-_aymnt'n Systemn and CYe 2010 Payment Rates; Corirectio)ns;
Final Rulel, Notice and ropo_-sedl Rule, 42 Fed. Reg, 46435 (Au,_g, 3, 2010) (to)
be codified at 42 CFR, P~ts, 410) 41 6, 419),
5ehe Cran,e et al., styt noe 4, at 6, n.52; see abo Pub, L No. 1114 8
600 1(a)(3), cd
ela Social Security Act § 18377(i) (42 11S.C. § 1:395-nnr(i));
Pub, l No). 11I1- 152,§ 1106, co
eat Social Security Act §18, 77(i) (42
U S C. § 13 95nn(i))hriafe
" -Medicare Programr"; Priopo.,sed Chanrges to the1- Hospital Outpatient""
Plrospecotiv,-e PyetSystem ,,, and, C Y 2011 Plkaymn~,t Rates; P1roposedlJ6
Changes to the A~n&.multory Surgical Cent~er Playment System adCYX 2011
Paymentwi Rates: Proposed C'.han-ges to Payments to Hospitals for Certain
Inqpatienrt Hlospital Services and form. Graidiuate Medical Education Costs; and
Proposed. Ch711aunges to P~hysiciian Slefra Rules and R ,elated Changes to
PodeAgemnReuain,75 Fed, Reg, ait 46 170,
leId at 4643 1,
'3 See CA1S Finalzes Rulesy Rest,.rictinh,,g.
ROPES'
Nov 4,dn
4,yton
200 http//ww ropsgra

l

4

E.ps
os-(x

0, '.!1,4E
4,5,5,9,ad10
-z, 14,a6;seil

Crht

hwDe,17120,
to theo Ambulatory

f-u/
Il
vulnle (
00)
e z, 0S'"wP"tcntI
aoi-A11IublCrectSnnay,
2,()_10,

s izb

z
.RS umr]

rsetaL,

iNke4

dt,

11

54
rt
, n ,n r,- ,,
eiadinChlrl
lath
plcfin
eeni,
Rq ienns
Y~iina
Splsim-sa'Z d(.mpac
oitrafayne
u.pir,7
id e.M
A at 0114,48 1W7-5
Medirkd Whol Hospitala.',I
Adiioa ScRAnin
16o.
16

-

Poim
es
PnsOPow
KO(et 3
00 t- eo-offedl
5,48
0))
ePr-g-a

CirnsHahl

MoaoiPyetSuspen-sion -s and Com-,plince Plan-s for Prov,.iders a ,ndt
Surppliers, 76 Fed- Reg, 5894,
mfldl,, at 58 '70) 58 9z4,
Id, at,

18

eiae
Mdci
2 tn,38,39
3 6)

xenesAto
210(oild

01O
s- niieli

2U,

5868

k Pubit) I No 1,1134, § 64057, 1241 Stat, 119 (2010),

aCranle

,4

et ald, synt

543

291

noe 4., at 8"23hI

*Idl at 8
((iin . L YNo111-152, 1304, (cdeda
Social Secuirity
Act §1866(j) (4-2 'USC, § 1395ccoj))
m1u Pu, L,No111-1252, § 130)3, 124-11
Stat, 1029 (2010),Apiaoi
mPubl L NO.111148,

23Id
11

je,,eAMdcd.

a,

CirrbHal

m"aora,[.ynet lsesoi
"cd,
at59117

(06406.

"9 Medicare, Medicaid11, anid Childreni's Hlealth hIsu.ran-rce Programs;7

IsanePoaZ'
Ics
idc
P-.n fo

AdiinlScreeing, Requihrements, App- lication Flee s, Temn-iporary Enolet
!iat5)1i,
Moaoipayen; Sspnson an,-,d. Compliance Plans fo~r Pirov,,iders aundli'
25hI
Supliers, 75 FdRegn 58,213, 58,217, 58,220 (Sept, 23, 2010) (to be
codified at 42 CER, pt., 405, 424, 438, 447, 455, 457, 498', 1007),
" c 58214-15,
1, a
14/ at 58228- 29,21I
218215t 1)18
5, AL t

98
,,

4
\- I at 582 17,
mMedicare, Medicaid, and hldes Healtih Isuran-ce Programs;1)11)
S 89
22lta
Additional Screenin--g Rqie ntApplication Fees, Temporary Enrolme~nt
Moratoria," PNYm~ent Suspension~s anid C'_omrplianrce Pln Or Prov~iders anid
Suppliers, 76
IF Re15907-08 (Feb, 2,' 2010)) (to be codified ait 42 C.E-R, pt,
t 98
40," 424, 447,T 455,l 457, 498),
mMedicare, Med iad n Children' Hiealth Inusurance Pirogramns;Ida59,
Additiosnal Screenig Rqre
ntApplication- FeCes,
Temnporary Enrollment
1ak59,
Moratria, aymet Suspenisioni-s anid CoplanePlans fiorlProv,,'idlers and,11
Sukppliers, '75 had. Reg&58,213,
*Id at 58213,

!wMedicaru-e1, Medicaid". anid Children's HealthInuac Progerams
Additional Screening R ,eqirements, Application Fee s, T'em-porary Enrolhnent0
Mara5,
Suplirs 761Fedplirs
Reg 5903Rg,\t-5,23

ymentori." Suspensions

andprsstmi Comd(rpliance Plans for Prvies n

2"0 -' c at 5902,

5

14 , at 5899,

20-

Medicare" Medicaid, anld Children-'s Hea-.lth Insu.wrnce P1rogrami-s;
Additional,\_' Sclreen,.ig Rqie ntApplicationr Fees, emoayEnrollment
Moratoria, Paynent Suspenision's a'nd Comnpl
ince Plans fOr Providers and
Supplieirs, 76 Fed Reg, 5903,
201

20"- 15

a~

't 5900,

,,

d iin lS re igII
Mrtra,
Slseiin
n
Sijpir,7 1 -A ea
92
ik 92
t593,4
,
a
95

ntA pic:.)t 'es, -i-rp r-r
o,-ila-'\. l~i
YN

20'-Id at 5906,
J Id a 5907,
20

Ic

Addtina

at 5 9 0 74
Screening Reurmns

22Id at:5917,

1 42
Appicaio

Fees TeprrIErlmn

,e -

at,4k .t7

Crn et al, sigt note 4L.at 8-,III
4,§
02
10 hi e also Pubh L, No,,, 111 148, § 6411, cdeatSocial Security Act
3"Meia,
dciklLarl.
rnsAMnimc
fng-t
AdionlSrengppcaoitFes
11902(a)(42) (42 11S.C. § 1396a(a)(42)) and Social Security Act § 1893(h1-)
aya
(42 U!S. C. I 395ddd(h)),
te Cran et aloltos
sup noted 4-o, at 94Id. at 4,30
uzLN
2Idh.-, Se also Puib,... No).111- 148, § § 64 02 (d)(2), codif h", ied 'a".t Social
311,,1,N,,11,j
o,
101;Crtet-i
ixn4,it7
Secutrity Act § 1128A(a:) (41 'U&SC
§ 1320a-7a:(a)), and 64108(a), codgied tPuLNmIII-14§602
Social Security Act §I1128A(a) (41 U
§. 132k0a,- 7a(a)),,i§603(ietnthScrayOf1
Iwdel_ pdtos
" Crane et at, supr no - k)te 4, at 4, n 38, ,Se al Iso PubA. L. No. 111 - 14 8,
o '-pa
33I
S64102(d)(2), codedie at Social Security Act § 1128A(a) (41 U-,SC §
12aaa),and 60()coiedatSo_ cial Security Act (1128IANa) (41
, ,,a
1
U.S.C If320a,, 7ai(a)); StAAN spmnoe 3, at 2,
i tt
t
f )(
Pub). L. No). 111 -1418, (,11 gg
sur note 4 t45(ctn
See , Crane et at
6402(d)(2)(B) (codified at 42 1SIC.A. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(F+( 1)),
7
21 Crane et al., supra note 4, a4(qoig42 .S.C.A
h(i' 1320a-§§7a02a)(5112
Se Pub~k.
L No.I 1,1134, § 6402(d)(2)(B3) (codAified at 42 U. SCA,,,oa
130a7ai)6)F)(I);see ao Crne et al", s
n oe 4f at 4T5 These
61
exceptions include:,:21m
[]any retmneration which prootes access to care and pooses a4low risk\
23m
patiets anrd, the FedeAl health care prog~ram; [2] the offe or
ohamto)
trnfe oiterns or services "br-free or at less thianfir nmrket valu_,e bytw270

a person fb~r certain co\up(onts, rebates, or othereo rewa, ,,rds firomi-- a retailer; 3511
[3] the offeor or trantsfer of iternis or services fobr fi-ee or\,at less thain fair
mau-rket. value by a pern
o certain iterns or, services not o)ffiered. as part
of1aniy advertisemnent Corsolicitation, that are not tied11 to) the provisio)n
of oher services reimbaursed by MN~ledicare o\r Medicaid whertere
is
a esnbeconnection btt ecte the iterns or services ando tlhemeia
care (of theio indiv,.idua,,,l and where the person provides theo itert-ns o~r services Id
aferdeerinngin goo)d faith that the individual is in flinancial need;: orn
date specified by thle Secretary (buit not earlierInpco
[]subtject to antffctv
thant Jan. Ls2011), the wavrby a prescrip-%tiont- drug planh~t- sponsor of a tteVWofk)
fgrigAAtxis
pirescrip_ tion drug plan uder Medicare Part D)or- an,, MAorganization
ofrnanM PDplan under Mdedicare Pa, rt C(ofany copaynent for
Plmhr
e-fy
tefirst fill ofhi a coveredl part D) drug that is a generic drug for individuails
enrolled in the prescriptiion dru plan or MA-IPD pla, respectively,
5 e Ce
et al_,
sgn noe 4, ait 6-7,
loidt at 6 (citingj Pubn L. No&111-1,48, § 6002 (codifed at 42 U.S.C.A. § (
grignitut
1,320a-7b(a_-)(1)(A)),
2s e ici at5

2

i.,I
eirlltq c:cutb
1-iscat, StlefciaA.it-Kckaqaw
L
--AQ-- 'k_~ 1to _1
: 0
\*.I\I -,,-,,:, ,-o, h
e,
C o-_i- cki''ubo(.aoadIn13h
h'ii
ii o- m yle- ,kt,' ."r O t ,2HC)i.2

adIu-arSev
n

bt

6e.e

See id

Seye Puby L. NoA111-148, § 64.08(b)(2) (co,,difieod at- 42
952(g();see also Crane eotA, suynn,, n"to 4, at 5,
e11Pub, LpN,

1118

48b()B)(oiida

ISC-'A,,§leiim

io
re

,-mr.

w
39 sa 7
tteVWsopH _gkdlii

mgHsigEm
CO t irpi,

2USCA

28 ePb L No., 111048,§ 6408(b)(2)(CB) (codiified ait 42 11,"SC' A§

ZeadigAttut

hsc\.ttSl-e1(era

it-dhbc. a

,1 10 8,S

patensor certainl designated heAWt services to an enitVith wVhich the
fml mme has a'finlancial relationship, unless
pycinor an nneit
aexetoaplies, Anl entity receiving a prohibited referay
not bilt
'-edicare program' for the resulting trn n services),
the M
Aat 1320a b(b)(1), (2) (stating that persons m-l-ay
no)t kIny
in"30I
offer- or reevdirecly or ndrclovertly or comverlt'y-, ina cash orl"
koind, anly rmnrtotoinlduce or influence the furnishing, arrngeent
puirchase, leasing, or ordering of itemis or services fwhich paymnent mny-be
miade in whlole or in partk
,SHastingset
und e deral health-c-are pr-ogramlr~)
(explaining that assigminentl occur'"s when5a
344 Id0 at § 30,7~j2
benleficiary ask~s thI-at a Medicare paym-en--t be m-ade directly to th-le prkovider.',
If a provider accepts assignmnent, Medcr will directly pay,. the fece schedutleat7
be responsible f1or paying
amnounlt for the'mservices, and! the beneficiary wiAvll

the conu
ancad ayrmann deductible. Cletvy
the ite sclhedule
paymnent and conuac/eutbeare re-ferred to as the "alkonved amun"
By accepting assignmnent, the provider agrees to accept the ""allowVed amount"n

l

atnse
'36Matz
t5
4

oe37

t23

,,

32-T,1,at

atn supm" not 397, atrv2es

33A

15
35

Id
a T

